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Chapter  18   Development, Poverty & Inequality 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction box    The 2009 Kenyan Food Crisis 
 
The chronic food shortages which afflicted Kenya between 2006 and 2009 prompted the 
government to declare a national emergency and international relief agencies to warn that a 
sudden escalation of deaths from starvation and ill-health related to malnutrition was imminent 
without significant political action. The causes of the crisis were manifold but amongst 
contributory factors were the following: 
• The previous five years had seen several droughts reduce water supplies well below 
normal levels and negatively affect crop yields. 
• President Kibaki’s government had been accused of being negligent- and possibly 
fraudulent- in distributing international aid. Concerns at corruption had prompted many 
international pressure groups not to give aid to the country. 
• Internal conflict between tribes and political factions, triggered by a contentious 2007 
Presidential election, disrupted the sale of food within the country. Many farmers horded 
food supplies and increased tension emerged in terms of the allocation of this and 
dwindling water sources.  
• The Kenyan economy had suffered as a consequence of an unprecedented rise in world 
food prices over recent years augmented by the global financial collapse of 2008-9. Many 
see greed in wealthy countries as a factor behind the global food crisis with the supply of 
food in the world negatively affected by more agricultural land being converted to 
growing crops for biofuels used in cars, rather than food.  Similarly, the global financial 
crisis was caused by greedy corporate practises in wealthy countries but its effects were 
felt everywhere and most acutely in Less Developed Countries like Kenya.  
 
Hence this crisis could variably be chiefly explained by: a) poor governance b) the misfortune of 
experiencing a natural disaster or c) the exploitative nature of the global economy. The rival 
explanations for this particular episode essentially mirror the wider debate on the root causes of 
inequality, poverty and a lack of economic development in many parts of the world explored in 
this chapter. 
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From reading this chapter you will be able to; 
• Comprehend the disparity of wealth in the contemporary world and appreciate rival 
explanations for this phenomenon. 
• Evaluate competing arguments for the causes of hunger and famine in the world. 
• Be able to evaluate, from a variety of theoretical perspectives, the progress of 
international policies designed to facilitate the development of poorer states over the 
past sixty years.  
 
The Persistence of Global Poverty 
To paraphrase Rousseau via Orwell all states are born equal but some are born more equal 
than others. The spread of sovereignty through the international system over the last five 
centuries has given us a world today in which the map has been redrawn from one dominated 
by a small number of vast international empires to a post-imperial mosaic of around 200 
independent states each free to pursue their domestic affairs as they choose and conduct 
relations with fellow members of this ‘sovereign club’, protected by international law. That, 
of course, is the theory. The reality is quite different. Most ex-colonies have struggled to 
match their former colonial masters in economic or political terms, even with legal equality 
in place, and, leaving aside the legacy of history, it stands to reason that some states, whether 
through luck or political guile, will be richer and more influential than others.  
 
Poverty, in general and in relation to international relations, can be expressed in two forms: 
relative and absolute. 
 
Relative poverty 
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Economic inequality in the world has always existed but is more pronounced today than it 
has ever been and there is little evidence that this trend is likely to be reversed in the 
foreseeable future. The 80:20 ratio is a well-known and effective means of expressing global 
inequality. Roughly 80% of the world’s people live in the ‘Global South’ but only 20% of the 
world’s wealth is possessed by those same countries. Hence the reverse of this is that the 
‘Global North’ has 20% of the World’s people but 80% of its resources. During the Cold War 
it was customary to subdivide the world into three groupings: the Global North comprised the 
developed capitalist First World and the Communist Second World, whilst the Third World 
was the less developed remainder of states principally in Latin America, Africa and south 
Asia. China could be said to span the Second and Third Worlds but, as a developing country, 
is categorized as in the South. (see box 18.1)  This ‘North’ and ‘South’ are only loosely 
geographic and an increasing number of countries cannot easily be fitted into either camp. 
The development of oil rich Middle Eastern states and ‘Asian Tigers’, like South Korea and 
Singapore made the distinction unclear even before the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, 
the 80:20 statistic still gives us a useful snapshot of the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in today’s 
world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.nationsonline.org/bilder/third_world_map.jpg 
Box 18.1  The Global North and South 
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1.4 billion people (just over one-quarter of the world) live on or below an income equivalent 
to $1.25 per day (the more striking indicator of $1 per day was abandoned by the World Bank 
in 2005 due to the inevitable impact of inflation) (Ravallion and Chen 2008) . Perhaps most 
striking is the fact that the disparity between the haves and have-nots has significantly 
widened over recent decades. The world’s richest 20% of people (not countries) had a 
combined wealth 30 times greater than the poorest 20% in 1960 but by 1997 this ratio had 
widened to 74:1 (UNDP 1999: 36-38).  
 
It is, however, an age old political debate as to whether such relative inequality- even if it is 
ever-increasing- necessarily constitutes a problem or is an indicator of political failure. Put 
very simply the political left consider that it is morally unacceptable that resources should be 
so unevenly allocated whilst many Liberals and Conservatives would not necessarily agree 
that ‘relative poverty’ is a problem and a failing. For example, the Liberal philosopher 
Rawls’s test of justice for a political system contends that inequality in the distribution of 
social goods can be considered fair if the least advantaged, nonetheless, gain increased social 
goods over time and everyone has the opportunity to advance (Rawls 1971). In this view 
inequality can still be fair. 
 
Absolute poverty 
Whilst not everyone would accept that the existence of great and ever-widening disparities in 
wealth across the world represents a problem or a political failing, the persistence of absolute 
poverty, in the form of hunger and famine, must indisputably represent a problem and a 
political failing. Whether this amounts to a domestic or global political failure, however, is 
open to debate. 
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Eradicating absolute poverty has long been articulated as an important aim of international 
politics but today remains a problem of a similar dimension to what it was in 1963 when US 
President John Kennedy stated at the UN World Food Congress; ‘We have the means; we 
have the capacity to wipe hunger and poverty from the face of the Earth in our lifetime. We 
need only the will’. 
 
A famine is a sudden increase in mortality resulting from food shortages. The more precise 
causes of famines are frequently disputed by analysts and politicians. Most famines are the 
result of a combination of both natural and political factors and disputes on causation centre 
on determining the relative weighting of these two dimensions. There are three fundamental 
explanations for any particular famine related to the balance between the supply and demand 
for food. 
 
1. A fall in the food supply. 
2. An increase in the demand for food. 
3. Disruptions to the normal distribution of food. 
 
The third of these factors is most particularly influenced by politics and economics. As will 
be explored in the next section, if considered from a global perspective, all famines can be 
attributed to explanation three since there is demonstrably sufficient food in the world for all 
people to be adequately fed. We do not live by effective global governance, however, and all 
three explanations can variously be applied to the situation in states where famines do occur. 
The food supply in countries can fall below the level sufficient to meet demand because of 
poor harvests or the population can grow at a rate that the food supply is unable to match.  
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When famines occur, however, natural variations in supply and demand are frequently 
magnified by political factors. The famines that ravaged Ireland in 1845-7 and India on 
several occasions throughout the 19th Century, for example, had natural causes but are 
generally considered to have been exacerbated by the political situation of the two countries. 
Droughts instigated the Indian famines and a potato blight the Irish disaster and, whilst their 
British rulers did not cause nor wish such suffering on their colonials, a political failing must 
be considered to have occurred given that these were food shortages occurring on the watch 
of the world’s richest country. More recently, the 1990s North Korean famine had natural 
origins but was, undoubtedly, greatly worsened by the government’s drive for economic self-
sufficiency and a nuclear weapon capability, which has seen food imports reduced at the 
same time as the domestic food supply has dwindled.   
 
The demand for food continues to increase in the Global South and natural disasters continue 
to blight many of the same countries, creating food shortages, but most contemporary 
analysts of famine emphasize distributive factors in their explanations of particular cases. 
Modern governments can insure against future crop shortages by stockpiling reserves of food 
and protecting the price of agricultural products. As a consequence of this it is possible to 
construe protecting people against famine as a political obligation of governments as has 
most notably been highlighted by the Nobel prize winning Indian Economist Amartya Sen in 
his ‘entitlements thesis’ (see box 18.2). 
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Democratic governments are compelled to be responsive to the needs of ordinary people 
facing death by malnutrition, whether directly in elections or indirectly through pressure 
exerted by the media or other concerned citizens, in a way in which tyrannical dictators or 
neglectful colonialists are not. Hence Liberals believe that democracy saves people as well as 
empowers them and that democratization in the world will help in the fight against famine. 
Food shortages will still occur from time to time but these can normally be planned for by 
governments and, when they cannot be dealt with, the international community can step in.  
  
Hunger 
International political action, coordinated inter-governmentally by the UN’s World Food 
Programme (WFP) and non-governmentally by pressure groups such as OXFAM, CAFOD 
Box 18.2   Amartya Sen’s Entitlements Thesis 
 
Sen’s ‘entitlements approach’ argues that all individuals should by rights be able to expect 
to be protected from famine by their government, regardless of changes in food supply or 
population. Sen draws on extensive evidence to propose that; 
 
no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country 
with a relatively free press…..   
 
…Even the poorest democratic countries that have faced terrible droughts or floods 
or other natural disasters (such as India in 1973, or Zimbabwe and Botswana in the 
early 1980s) have been able to feed their people without experiencing a famine.  
(Sen 1999: 6-7) 
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and CARE  has, in recent decades, succeeded in curtailing the number of famines that occur. 
However, such groups are quick to point out that these periodic disasters are merely the tip of 
the global hunger ‘iceberg’. Far more people in today’s world die of starvation through plain 
poverty rather than as a result of short-term regional imbalances between the supply and 
demand for food. The WFP claim that some 25,000 people die every day as a result of hunger 
and related ailments and that over 1 billion in the world suffer from malnutrition (WFP 
2009)i. Some consider this a conservative estimate but this death toll undoubtedly outstrips 
more commonly prioritized threats to human existence, such as war and terrorism.  
 
Why, then, does such a death toll persist in a world in which the food supply is sufficient to 
permit every person in the world at least the recommended 2,700 calories per day?  
 
There are, essentially, three answers to this question in line with the general schools of 
thought concerning the equity of globalization outlined in Chapter 2. 
   
1. Globalists will tend to pin the blame for hunger on poor governance in the countries 
concerned. Corruption and / or a lack of democracy or a political reluctance to engage in 
international trade prevent people gaining the food they should be entitled to from their 
governments.   
 
2. Anti-globalists tend not to blame the governments of malnourished peoples for their 
plight as they see them as essentially powerless in the face of global economic structures. 
Marxist analysis argues that global economics accounts for hunger and famines more than the 
inadequate political responses of particular governments to crop failures. Marx himself 
considered the famines of his era to be the product of capitalism. It is, indeed, striking that so 
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many of the worst famines in history occurred in the late nineteenth century, an era of as-then 
unparalleled global economic liberalization when the trade in foodstuffs greatly increased. On 
a global level the production and trade in food reached new heights but profound inequality 
in the world saw many colonies exporting food Northwards whilst their own nationals went 
hungry.  
 
Marxist explanations for the persistence of poverty-induced starvation hold that it is, like 
famine, actually caused by the global economy and more a case of willful ignorance by the 
world’s wealthy. In the 1960s Norwegian peace studies scholar Johan Galtung, using 
language deliberately designed to equate the issue of global poverty with the typically 
prioritized concern of war, coined the phrase ‘structural violence’ to encapsulate the nature of 
the phenomenon; 
 
...if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is 
committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation, as 
during a siege yesterday or no such clear relation, as in the way economic relations 
are organized today.  
(Galtung 1969: 170)    
 
3. Alter-globalists do not accept that hunger is inevitable in a capitalist world economy 
but argue that global political failings are still culpable for the persistence of poverty. 
Alleviating hunger is possible without abandoning global capitalism by reforming 
international institutions and encouraging governments to act less selfishly in international 
trade. The ‘make poverty history’ campaign of the 2000s, for example, sought to increase 
public awareness of the daily death toll due to hunger and pressure governments into 
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structural political actions to alleviate this tragedy. The agricultural industry in the Global 
North has managed to remain largely exempted from the international trade liberalization of 
the last sixty years and, in many countries, enjoys heavy government subsidization and 
protection. This undermines the capacity of the Global South countries to export their food 
produce to Northern markets. The losses resulting from this distortion of the free market- an 
estimated annual $100 billion- far exceeds the sums given to the Global South in aid 
(Watkins 2002). Hence ‘trade not aid’ became a mantra of the Make Poverty History 
campaign in contrast to the charity-focused Band Aid / Live Aid movement of the 1980s 
which had inspired it. Hence Alter-Globalists argue for a ‘mixed economy’ for the world in 
which more political intervention is required in some cases but, in other instances, the 
invisible hand of the free market should be allowed to do its work.   
 
The logic of these three approaches applied to the wider theme of how poor countries can 
achieve development is expanded on in the next section. 
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Box 18.3  TIMELINE OF DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approaches to Development 
The Orthodoxy 
The orthodox position on poverty argues that it can be eradicated by those countries affected 
taking steps to replicate economic development of the kind experienced by global North 
states. In this view, Less Developed Countries (LDCs) can best mimic Northern development 
by integrating themselves into the global economy to permit export-oriented industries to 
flourish and gain from the inward investment provided by Multi-National Corporations 
 
1944 
1949 
 
1951 
 
1955 
1960 
 
1961 
1964 
 
1965 
1971-4 
 
1974 
1973-9 
1980 
 
1981 
1982 
1985 
1990 
1992 
1995 
 
2000 
2003 
2005 
2015 
 
Liberal International Economic Order 
Bretton Woods Conference establishes World Bank and IMF 
US President Truman’s Inaugural address promises help for ‘underdeveloped 
areas’ of the world. 
UN publishes Measures for Economic Development of Under-developed 
Countries. 
Non-Aligned Movement established 
‘UN Decade for Development’ begins 
Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth published. 
UN World Food Programme established 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) established 
Group of 77 established 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created 
Oil Crisis prompted by price rises engineered by Middle Eastern exporters. 
NIEO 
‘New International Economic Order’ adopted by UN General Assembly 
Tokyo Round of GATT 
Brandt Report published  
Washington Consensus 
Cancun Summit on International Development Issues 
Mexico payment defaults trigger debt crisis 
Live Aid concerts channel charitable aid to African famine relief 
UNDP’s annual Development Reports initiated  
UN Conference on Environment and Development 
World Trade Organization established 
Post-Washington Consensus 
Millennium Development Goals adopted 
Mass walkout of Global South delegates at Cancun WTO Summit 
‘Make Poverty History’ campaign holds Live 8 concerts 
Deadline for judging Millennium Development Goals 
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(MNCs). The clearest articulation of this view came from the influential US Economic 
Historian Walt Rostow with his ‘Stages of Growth’ thesis in the 1960s. Rostow analyzed the 
history of development in the North and concluded that all states pass through five similar 
stages of progression towards ‘take off’ and an end stage of a wealthy consumer-driven 
society (Rostow 1960). (see box 18.4 ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rostow’s thesis is part of the general belief that economic development is linked to 
modernization, a generic term encompassing a combination of social and economic changes 
Box 18.4 Rostow’s Five Stages of Economic Growth (1960) 
 
1. TRADITIONAL SOCIETY-  Pre-industrial economy and pre-modern society. 
e.g. Europe in the Middle Ages. 
2. PRECONDITIONS FOR TAKE OFF-  transition stage towards 
industrialization and modernization. Manufacturing industries emerge, banks emerge 
and the provision of education becomes more widespread.  e.g. Western Europe in 
the late 17th & early 18th Centuries. 
3. TAKE OFF- The industrial revolution and the key watershed for development. 
Economic growth becomes the norm and service industries emerge to aid 
manufacturing industries. e.g. Britain in the late 18th Century, France and US in the 
mid 19th Century. 
4. DRIVE TO MATURITY-  more national income is invested and the economy 
diversifies. e.g. Britain, France, US, and Germany in the late 19th Century. 
5. AGE OF HIGH MASS CONSUMPTION- a diverse economy based on 
consumer goods and services. 
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such as having smaller families, making transactions by money instead of bartering, 
secularization, mass education, literacy and urbanization. Encouraging foreign investment is 
seen as the key to being able to finance and learn how to embrace these changes. This then 
allows ‘take off’ to occur and permit export earnings to enrich producers and the wider 
society through the ‘trickle down’ effect of some of that money then being spent and invested 
in other sectors of the economy. 
 
The failure of many LDCs to show any sign of such progression over the last fifty years has 
dented the rigor of Rostow’s thesis but the discourse on international economic relations is 
still dominated by variations on this orthodox position. In particular, the successful economic 
development in the 1980s and 90s of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), such as the 
‘Asian Tigers’ of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, after opening themselves 
up to foreign investment and developing export-oriented manufacturing industries, served to 
reinforce the notion that a global route out of poverty is available for those states stuck in pre-
modernity. The subsequent recent growth of ‘Big Emerging Markets’ like Brazil, China and 
India is seen as further evidence of this view of progress. 
 
The new Liberal International Economic Order built from the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference was not, however, pure Economic Liberalism since the international development 
policy was founded on the notion that interventions from Global North states could and 
should stimulate economic growth in the South. The capitalist world had learned from the 
Great Depression of the 1930s that free markets do not always correct themselves when in a 
downturn and Keynesian Economics (named after the UK economist and politician John 
Maynard Keynes who was his country’s head delegate at the Bretton Woods Conference) had 
become mainstream in domestic economic policy. Keynesian economics advocates 
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government interventions and spending to combat unemployment and boost the demand for 
goods in order to kick-start a slumping economy. In line with this thinking, President 
Roosevelt had sought to regenerate the US economy in the 1930s by pumping money into the 
poorest areas of the country in his New Deal package (an approach not followed at the time 
in the UK). It was in this framework of thinking that the idea of a ‘New Deal’ for the 
capitalist world emerged in the mid 1940s with a US-led international drive to give foreign 
aid and developmental loans to the world’s poorest countries and offering incentives for 
businesses to locate there in order to stimulate growth. This interventionist variant of 
Economic Liberalism thus became the orthodoxy of the emergent development policy and the 
Liberal International Economic Order. 
 
Radical Challenges 
The conventional notion that economic development was a stage that all states would 
eventually reach if they underwent social and economic ‘modernization’ came to be 
challenged from the 1960s since much of the Global South had not experienced significant 
economic growth. ‘Dependency theorists’ led by Frank (1971) built upon the previous work 
of Structuralist economists like Paul Prebisch who advocated ‘Import Substitution 
Industrialization’, which saw protectionism as the route to global South development, rather 
than opening up trade with the global North. From this perspective developing states are 
nothing of the sort; they are dependent states being systematically and deliberately exploited 
by their wealthy counterparts. The global economic system requires underdeveloped states in 
order to feed the voracious capitalist appetite for more wealth in the developed states. Hence, 
building on evidence that some Latin American states’ economic fortunes improved rather 
than worsened when their principal trading partners were distracted in the Second World 
War, Frank and others advanced the notion that the poor states of the world would be better 
15 
 
off cutting themselves off from the Global North and concentrating on developing their own 
resources. (See Chapter 8)  
 
Wallerstein’s ‘World Systems Analysis’ is a less state-centric version of Structuralism which 
builds on the notion of a core of haves and a periphery of have nots’ inevitably occurring in 
dependent countries by applying this to the global level. In this view it is not so much the rich 
states of the world exploiting the poor states as a transnational wealthy class (including elites 
in less developed countries) exploiting a transnational class of the poor (including the poor in 
developed countries). (Wallerstein 1979) (See Chapter 8) 
 
Reformist Challenges 
A range of perspectives we will refer to as ‘Reformists’ do not reject the idea that all can 
progress in a capitalist world economy but believe that a more nuanced understanding of the 
process than that offered by the orthodoxy of the Liberal International Economic Order is 
required.  Reformists contend that the drive for pursuing economic growth through 
industrialization and modernization needs to be compromised in a variety of ways; 
 
• Needs-oriented growth 
In particular, the reformists came to challenge the notion that development was all about 
money and suggested that to observe economic growth was not necessarily to observe 
development. This approach to development contends that progress necessitates more than a 
growth of GDP per capita (total earnings of all citizens of a country divided by the number of 
people) since this might be just enriching a small elite in a country, in line with the core-
periphery phenomenon outlined earlier. Instead, real development should be judged in terms 
of improvements in securing ‘basic human needs’ for the whole population. The greater 
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provision of food, clothing, shelter, work and services like health care and education to the 
population of a state is considered a better indication of development than economic growth. 
 
To get over the limitations of judging development purely in economic terms, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) drew upon the expertise of academics like 
Amartya Sen, to devize a ‘Human Development Index’ to rank a country’s progress (see box 
18.5). This figure combines income, life expectancy and educational attainment to give a 
more thorough picture of whether a state’s wealth is being utilized to the benefit of its people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(*purchasing power parity- factoring in the relative worth of a state’s money) (UNDP 2008) 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
 
Anomalies emerge from comparing income and HDI which demonstrate that there is more to 
development than money. Equatorial Guinea was Africa’s richest country and ranked in the 
top 30 of the world by GDP per capita as recently as 2004 on the back of export earnings 
from oil production. Most of the country’s citizens have not benefited from the oil rush, 
however, as it has been beset with corruption, poor governance and civil turmoil. Hence 
states which, for various reasons, do not utilize their resources for the benefit of all of their 
people are judged, by HDI, to be less developed than their GDP would suggest. Equally some 
Box 18.5 HDI versus GDP  
Richest states- by 
GDP per capita 
ppp.* (HDI rank in 
brackets) 
Highest HDI rank 
compared to GDP 
Lowest HDI rank 
compared to GDP 
Poorest states (HDI 
in brackets)  
1. Luxembourg (18) 
2. USA (12) 
3.Norway (2) 
4. Ireland (5) 
5. Iceland (1) 
Cuba (51/94) 
Myanmar (132/167) 
Palestine (106/139) 
Tajikistan (122/154) 
Albania (30/98) 
Botswana (124/54) 
S. Africa (121/56) 
Eq. Guinea (127/73) 
Namibia (125/172) 
Swaziland (141/104) 
173.Niger (174) 
174.Tanzania (159) 
175.Congo DR (168) 
176.Burundi (167) 
177.Malawi (164) 
17 
 
countries, such as Cuba and Albania, under HDI can be understood as more developed than 
their income would suggest due to relatively good health and educational systems benefitting 
their citizens. At the same time, the most developed countries by GDP are rich but not 
necessarily the richest in terms of overall quality of life. The US may be the world’s second 
wealthiest state but the average life expectancy of its citizens has sometimes been surpassed 
by much poorer Cuba in recent years. However, the fact that Cuba and Myanmar, two 
dictatorships where political opponents are regularly jailed, rank so highly does suggest, 
however, that HDI scores do not encompass quality of life in terms of rights and freedom.    
 
• Gender-neutral growth 
In a clear illustration of how national economic growth may not be to the advantage of all, the 
‘Women in Development’ movement emerged in the 1970s to highlight the gendered effects 
of orthodox development thinking. A globalizing women’s social movement and an 
emerging feminist approach to Development Studies revealed how, often,  modernization and 
industrialization may have produced economic growth but one that benefitted only men. 
Industrialization tends to favour male employment as the prevailing assumption across most 
of the world is that men are better suited to hard manual labour. This is the model developed 
countries followed in earlier ages and therefore assumed appropriate in development projects. 
In contrast, agricultural labour in much of the world has traditionally been shared more 
equally between men and women. Hence the growth of urban industries in many developing 
countries in the 1950s and 60s saw women’s employment and income often decline in the 
face of overall economic ‘progress’.  
 
As the emphasis of global development policy shifted towards encouraging domestic reforms  
in the 1980s, the gendered implications of the interventions took a new form. The focus of 
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Structural Adjustment Policies on cutting public expenditure in order to balance the books, 
whilst often harmful to men as well, tend to have a greater impact on women since they are 
more often the principal child rearers and as such more vulnerable to the effects of a decline 
in the provision of schooling or health services.   
 
• Endogenous growth 
Whilst not going as far as the Dependency theorists in advocating the outright severance of 
trade links with the developed world, many reformists came to argue for a measure of short 
term economic nationalism to protect infant industries. Countries like Britain, the US and 
Germany had not had to open up themselves to foreign competition in the early stages of their 
industrialization and had employed protectionist measures, such as putting tariffs on foreign 
imports. Countries developing in the nineteenth century had been able to grow up until strong 
enough to find their way in the world and had not had to open themselves up to competition 
as rapidly as was being expected of their twentieth century equivalents, it came to be 
reasoned. 
 
• Sustainable growth 
The globalization of environmental politics saw the emergence of the notion that economic 
growth may need to be compromised if it was at the expense of the environment. This ‘Limits 
to Growth’ thesis was most unpalatable to those countries who had not yet got to ‘grow’ and 
so came to be succeeded in environmental political discourse by ‘Sustainable Development’. 
This approach acknowledges that economic development has to be a priority for the Global 
South but tht it should not be pursued without regards to its polluting consequences. Longer 
term thinking was required if development could be sustainable in the long term and not be a 
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quick dash for profit which saw future generations hampered by a depletion of resources and 
an increase in pollution. (see Chapter 23) 
 
The Evolution of Development Policy 
 
The 1950s & 1960s- Orthodoxy 
The very new political landscape at the end of the Second World War was where the idea of 
development in international politics took hold. Harry Truman first used the term 
‘underdevelopment’ in his inaugural US Presidential address of 1949. With Western Europe 
no longer the source of political power in the world the one thing the two new superpowers 
could agree on was that the former colonies of Britain, France, The Netherlands and Portugal 
should be free to pursue their own destiny and given a helping hand to make their way in the 
world. Of course, Cold War Realpolitik as well as empathy was at work and the US and 
USSR each saw the emergent ‘Third World’ as an arena in which they could secure strategic 
allies in the context of the unfolding ideological conflict. Many parts of Latin America, Asia 
and Africa became the focus of superpower competition, most prominently in Korea, 
Vietnam and Cuba. 
 
 
The 1970s- New International Economic Order 
The first systematic challenge to the orthodoxy which had directed development policy in the 
1950s and 1960s was a package of reformist ideas which became known as the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). Utilizing the changed composition of the UN, which 
occurred due to the wave of decolonization that had swept Asia and Africa, the ‘Third 
World’ found its voice in the General Assembly and a challenge to the international 
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economic orthodoxy was signaled with the creation of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development in 1964, headed by the radical Argentine economist Paul Prebisch. 
That year also saw the launch of G77, a coalition of (initially seventy seven) Third World 
states acting in unison to give themselves more leverage in international trade negotiations 
and advance the cause of development. The Non-Aligned Movement, set up in 1955 as an 
organization of states declaring themselves to be aligned to neither Cold War superpower, 
also became a vehicle of Third World solidarity and announced an NIEO manifesto at its 
annual summit of 1973. This emergent Third World activism was then fuelled by the 1971-4 
Oil crisis that was already challenging the supremacy of the developed ‘First World’ in global 
economic relations.  
 
The list of reformist demands making up the NIEO was adopted by the General Assembly in 
1974 by 120 votes to 6 (including among the dissenters the US and UK). The NIEO sought to 
offer global South states certain protections within the framework of the world’s Liberal 
International Economic Order and promote a more endogenous form of economic growth. 
The key demands are summarized in box 18.6. 
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As the 1974 General Assembly vote indicates, the NIEO was something broader than a wish 
list of the worlds underprivileged. Many Global North governments and a burgeoning 
movement of humanitarian international pressure groups also took up the cause. Several 
NIEO themes were taken up by the Reports of the Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues (better known as the Brandt Reports) of the late 1970s and early 80s, a 
fairly conservative think-tank set up at the suggestion of the World Bank. The Brandt Reports 
upheld the virtues of liberalizing trade but advocated greater international cooperation to 
cushion LDCs from the insecurities of free trade and help them to help themselves. 
Box 18.6  the ‘New International Economic Order’ demands 
 
• Full sovereign control of Northern MNCs operating in their territories. 
• Debt relief. 
• Reallocation of military expenditure in the developed world on global 
South development. 
• Preferences in trading rules to allow LDCs to be able to compete with 
other countries and gain access to protected developed world markets. 
• Greater emphasis on ‘technology transfers’ from North to South in aid 
and development programmes.  
• Establishment of ‘Common Funds’ to stabilize the global price of primary 
products on which many Less Developed Countries are dependent. 
• Reform of the World Bank and IMF so that Less Developed Countriess 
have a greater say in decision-making and that the conditions for IMF 
loans are more favourable. 
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Specifically on the question of hunger, the Brandt reports advocated; greater food aid, the 
establishment of a global grain reserve, less agricultural protectionism and, more radically, 
land reform in LDCs to empower the poor (ICIDI 1980 pp.90-104).   
 
None of the specific NIEO demands came to be transformed directly into international policy 
but, to varying extents, they did start to become addressed in the progress of development 
policy in the 1970s and early 1980s.    
 
• MNCs 
Sovereign control over US and European corporations operating in oil exporting countries of 
the Global South was confirmed with the unfolding of the oil crisis of the 1970s, in which the 
likes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demonstrated they could and would manipulate the price of 
this key commodity. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) actions 
ensured that MNCs would now be set up in countries at the consent of the host state and 
abide by their terms. In the biggest of all oil producing countries the Saudi Arabian 
government through the 1970s gradually acquired full ownership of the chief company 
Aramco, originally controlled from the US.  
 
• Debt 
Debt escalated as a problem in the 1980s as a knock on effect of the 1970s oil crisis. The 
1970s economic downturn saw private banks in the Global North, who were the principal 
creditors of Global South countries, increase their interest rates and so also the repayment 
rates for development loans. Led by Mexico in 1982 several countries began defaulting on 
their debt repayments, on the basis that they were crippling their economies, and the whole 
global financial system appeared to be in danger of meltdown. Private banks responded by 
23 
 
devizing schemes to re-schedule the debt and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank, mindful that developing states were turning to the banks because their 
conditions were seen as too tough, looked to set better lending terms and find debt relief 
solutions. One prominent solution that came to be employed was for debtor states to allow 
MNCs to take some of their industrial assets in exchange for writing off some of the debt. 
These ‘debt for equity’ swaps and other initiatives relieved the crisis, although debt 
repayments continue to represent a huge burden for many Global South countries today. It is 
important to recognise that the response of the Global North to the debt crisis was not driven 
purely by altruism; it was also an exercize in self-preservation. The Global North’s banking 
system, as well as the economies of the Global South, appeared to be in danger of collapse 
due to the spiraling amount of debt that was building up. 
 
• Military Expenditure 
This NIEO aspiration, predictably, had little tangible impact on international affairs in the 
‘70s and early 80’s given the backdrop of the Cold War and unprecedented levels of arms 
expenditure. The end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s, however, did appear to open 
up opportunities for a ‘peace dividend’ to be allocated to development.    
 
• Preferences 
The principle of exempting developing countries from some of the commitment to free 
international trade being developed through the implementation of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was promoted by UNCTAD and established in the Tokyo GATT 
Round of 1973-79. Under the Generalized System of Preferences which emerged Developed 
countries could allow Less Developed Countries to export to them on terms preferable to 
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those given to other GATT countries on the understanding that this was ‘positive 
discrimination’ intended to help those countries. (see chapter 16)  
 
• Technology Transfers  
One key concern with orthodox development policy was that it was too fixated with monetary 
loans rather than passing on skills to allow the developing country itself to get itself on its 
feet. The old maxim of ‘Give a man a fish and he will feed for a day. Teach a man to fish and 
you feed him for a lifetime’ was not being observed and a too short-termist view of economic 
progress was being employed. In response in 1975 the UN General Assembly passed 
Resolution 3384 calling for reform of the Paris Convention on Intellectual Property to loosen 
standards seen as limiting the possibility for Less Developed Countries to mimic 
technological innovations subject to patents. 
 
• Common Funds 
Common Funds also became a feature of some trading regimes established between North 
and South in the 1970s. For example, as part of its Lome Convention with African, Caribbean 
and Pacific island states from 1975 the European Community introduced the STABEX and 
SYSMIN mechanisms under which Global South exporters could receive compensation for 
loss of earnings due to a fall in the price of a range of, respectively, certain agricultural 
products and minerals.  
 
• IMF/World Bank Reform 
Third World demands for voting reforms to the financial institutions was not responded to but 
the shifting tide in development politics and thinking did begin to have some impact on how 
they operated. The IMF did not deviate too much from its Economic Liberal path but the 
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World Bank in the 1970s shifted to a Basic Needs approach to development which was more 
skeptical about the notion of ‘trickle down’ and sought to ensure that projects benefitted the 
poorest sectors of developing countries. US conservative politician Robert McNamara did 
much to promote the Basic Needs approach in his tenure as President of the World Bank, 
which included setting up the Brandt Reports to further develop these ideas. 
 
 
1980s &90s- Washington Consensus 
 
Following this period of reform, the 1980s witnessed a revival of the Economic Liberal 
orthodoxy in development politics, often encapsulated in the expression ‘The Washington 
Consensus’ (so named to highlight the importance of the US government and the IMF, based 
also in Washington). A decline in Global South influence and the marginalization of the 
NIEO agenda occurred through this decade, which can largely be explained by four 
international political developments; 
 
1.  The end of the Cold War 
The gradual coming to an end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, although giving an 
opportunity for non-military issues to gain global attention, actually represented a set back for 
the Third World since there was no longer a first and second world to play off each other. In 
the 1970s many African, Asian and Latin American countries were able to compete for the 
attention of two superpowers who saw it as in their strategic interests to help them. The 
enthusiasm for development articulated by US Presidents, such as Truman and Kennedy, was 
undoubtedly influenced by their desire to steer African and Asian states away from the lure of 
Communism. This became evident when, with the ending of the Cold War, much of the focus 
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of Western Europe and North America shifted to the transition of the former Communist 
countries and further marginalized the Global South.     
 
2.  A breakdown of Third World solidarity 
The very notion of a Third World was further undermined throughout the 1980s and beyond 
by the fact that, whilst it was always a diverse grouping of states, its ‘membership’ gradually 
became so disparate that they ceased pulling in the same direction. The OPEC countries had 
helped inspire Third World countries not fortunate enough to possess bountiful oil deposits 
but the economic growth of countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait saw them essentially join 
the First World. Similarly, the ‘Asian Tigers’ or ‘Newly Industrialized Countries’, like 
Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, had joined the developed world by taking them on at 
their own game and producing modern manufactured goods more cost-efficiently than them. 
At the other end of the scale some of the Third World of the 1970s had made such little 
economic progress in the following decade that many commentators started to talk of a 
‘Fourth World’, containing countries impoverished by war and / or famine; like Afghanistan, 
the Congo, Zambia and Ethiopia. In addition to this, political conflicts between elements of 
the Third World served to further undermine their cohesiveness as a coalition. The 1980 Iran-
Iraq war disrupted Middle Eastern cooperation and the persistence of disputes in other parts 
of the developing world, such as between India and Pakistan, Ethiopia and Somalia and Libya 
and Chad further diluted solidarity.          
 
3. A reassertion of First World power  
In addition to international political changes serving to dilute the influence of the Third 
World, it is important to recognize that another factor serving to bring back the orthodoxy in 
development politics was that orthodox elements in the First World successfully fought back 
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against the coalition of the South. Displays of Third World solidarity inspired the First World 
to follow suit and beat them at their own game. The shock of the challenge presented by 
OPEC prompted the major oil importing countries to similarly cooperate by forming a 
directly rival body, the International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA is a cartel of consumers 
which seeks to coordinate the positions of First World countries vis a vis OPEC by 
negotiating as a bloc over prices and stockpiling reserve barrels of oil in a collective manner.  
Similarly, in another case of Goliath mimicking David, the impact of G77 prompted the 
world’s richest countries to form G7 to further strengthen their positions in trade negotiations 
through unity.     
 
4.  The Rise of the ‘New Right’ 
In addition to structural and political changes the Washington Consensus was also inspired by 
an intellectual sea change. A renaissance in classic Economic Liberal thinking occurred in the 
1980s as a backlash against the apparent failings of ‘Keynesian Economics’ as a consequence 
of the economic downturn of the 1970s. Conservative politicians, most notably President 
Ronald Reagan in the US and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK, looked to 19th 
Century Liberalism to revamp their ideology. Both were swept into power to carry out 
mandates at odds with four decades of cross-party political consensus in favour of a reformist 
‘mixed economy’ combining free enterprise and a strong role for government in providing a 
welfare safety net for the poor and often baling out ailing industries.  
 
Thatcher and Reagan’s New Right philosophy was principally targeted at their domestic 
economies, seeing the privatization of state run industries and the scaling back of government 
ministries as a way of reviving the economic fortunes of the two countries, once they were 
voted into office in 1979 and 1980 respectively. The New Right philosophy also, however, 
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spilled over into foreign policy and international development. At a major international 
development summit at Cancun in 1981, intended to push forward the Brandt Report agenda, 
the attending Reagan and Thatcher launched an assault on the NIEO effectively bringing to 
an end this period of reformist international economic relations. 
 
The New Right also took the fight to the UN.  In 1984 the government delegations of the US, 
UK and prominent Asian Tiger Singapore walked out of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in protest at what was claimed to be a 
wasteful global bureaucracy promoting left wing propaganda. The following year the US 
began defaulting on their budget contributions to the UN. This was a ‘hardball’ strategy 
designed to threaten the Third World that the whole UN system, which had done much to 
give them a voice, could effectively be dismantled if they did not tow the new line. 
 
The debt crisis of the 1980s provided an opportunity for New Right ‘monetarist’ economic 
policies to be put into practice on the international political stage. Faced with the prospect of 
countries defaulting on their loan repayments, the emphasis of the World Bank and IMF in 
bailing out Third World countries in economic crisis shifted from lending more money to 
‘Structural Adjustment Policies’ of tying assistance to the enactment of measures to control 
inflation and seek economic growth through private rather than state-led enterprises. Just as it 
was felt that poor citizens of the US and UK could best be helped by allowing them to help 
themselves by becoming less dependent on state benefits, saving their money and becoming 
more entrepreneurial, the New Right felt poor states needed to keep their own finances in 
order and allow the invisible hand of market forces, rather than handouts, to fuel their 
development. 
 
29 
 
Hence the agenda of international development politics in the 1980s and early 90s was once 
again chiefly informed by the Economic Liberal orthodoxy but a purer more ‘fundamentalist’ 
orthodoxy than that seen in the 1950s and 1960s. Most notably, Japanese and East Asian 
state-led industrialization was marginalized from the new discourse through Japanese fears of 
provoking further hostility from the US and Western European governments who were 
already at loggerheads with them over levels of protectionism and the persistent running of a 
trade deficit (Payne 2005: 77). Of course, not all of the First World shared this purist position 
but the balance of ideological and economic power within the North had shifted towards 
Washington. 
 
1990& 2000s- Post-Washington Consensus 
From the 1990s, however, we have witnessed the renaissance of an NIEO-like agenda and a 
Post-Washington Consensus emerge which, while still advocating economic development 
through modernization, acknowledges structural failings in the contemporary global 
economic system. The New Right tide ebbed away in the 1990s as evidence of the limitations 
of purely free market solutions to poverty became apparent. The Asian Tigers had followed a 
broadly orthodox script (albeit with a stronger role for government than many Economic 
Liberals would favour) but many Global South countries found the prescription of opening up 
their economies to foreign competition a bitter medicine with no remedial effects. In 
Mozambique, for example, their once major cashew nut industry collapsed in the early 2000s 
when they were compelled to stop subsidizing the sector as a condition of World Bank loans. 
With more interventionist administrations coming into power in London and Washington 
civil society criticism of Structural Adjustment became more prominent and, as a 
consequence, the World Bank came to listen to different voices and further re-oriented itself 
on a reformist and socially-conscious path. 
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‘The overall goal of development is therefore to increase the economic, political and civil 
rights of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religion, races, regions and countries’ 
(World Bank 1991: 31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding Stiglitz’s exit, the World Bank has continued on a reformist path and is now 
generally accepted to be a much more socially-oriented set of institutions than the IMF or 
other global economic fora like the World Trade Organization set up in 1995. Even under the 
stewardship of some ultra-conservative US-appointed Presidents a reformist approach has 
persisted since Social Policy and Development Studies perspectives have become established 
amongst staff previously dominated by traditional economists and financiers. Hence loans for 
development projects are now only approved after carrying out an Environmental Impact 
Box 18.7 Stiglitz Globalization and its Discontents 2002 
 
US academic and government advisor Joseph Stiglitz was chief Economist of the 
World Bank from 1997 to 2000 when he was forced out of his post in for his 
outspoken criticism of ‘free market fundamentalists’ in his organization and the IMF 
and WTO. He subsequently became the leading voice for the Post Washington 
Consensus, setting out his vision most clearly in his work Globalization and its 
Discontents; 
 
‘Even if Smith’s invisible hand were relevant for advanced industrialized countries 
the required conditions were not satisfied in developing countries. The market 
system requires clearly established property rights and the courts to enforce them’ 
(p.74)  
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Assessment and the implementation of ‘gender mainstreaming’ measures to ensure that the 
marginalization of women does not occur. 
 
The World Trade Organization, whilst undoubtedly dominated in decision-making terms by 
the Global North, has nevertheless given a prominent platform for the Global South to again 
project its voice. Global civil society, with campaigns such as ‘Make Poverty History’ has 
also played its part in giving momentum to an agenda for reform.  Hence some of the NIEO 
demands, having been largely ignored in the 1980s, have come back to the fore and, to some 
extent, been acted upon.  
 
In line with this Post Washington Consensus, and in order to move international development 
policy beyond rhetoric and build a genuine consensus, a new global reformist agenda, the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2000. Importantly, unlike the NIEO, the MDGs were also adopted by the IMF, World Bank, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and G7; institutions dominated by 
the Global North and with more political muscle than the UN’s talking shop.  
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Case Study box-  The Millennium Development Goals 
 
Goal 1: Reduce extreme poverty and hunger by half  
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women  
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality by two-thirds 
Goal 5: Reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters  
Goal 6: Reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases  
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability  
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development (fair trade and more aid) 
 
As can be seen the MDGs are far from a utopian wish-list and represent an attempt to set 
pragmatic and verifiable targets by which the international community can be judged. The 
baseline for the calculations are the various indicators as of 1990 and the judgment on meeting 
the goals will be made in 2015. 
 
Progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals in 2015 can best be described as 
‘mixed’. The proportion of the world living on less than $1.25 has fallen significantly but hunger 
levels have not improved. The World Food Programme estimates that the number of 
malnourished people in the world topped the 1 billion mark for the first time in 2009, 
significantly up on the 1990 level (WFP 2009). On unpicking these figures a general trend for all 
the goals emerges. Asia, Latin America and North Africa have seen significant progress, and are 
likely to meet many of the targets on a regional basis, but Sub-Saharan Africa is out of step with 
this improvement. Universal primary education is close to a reality in Asia and Latin America 
but over a quarter of Sub Saharan African children still do not attend school.  More girls have 
come to be enrolled in schools across the Global South but gender equality in 2015 is not a 
likely prospect. Similarly, child and maternal mortality rates have fallen significantly in much of 
the Global South but have not improved, (and even deteriorated), in much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Although significant funds have been mobilized for international programmes combating 
AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis these diseases show little sign of abating in the near future, with 
Sub-Saharan Africa again most afflicted. The goal of environmental sustainablity is, in itself, a 
mixed picture. The sub-aim of reducing by half the number of people without access to clean 
water is on target but indicators for deforestation, fish stocks and biodiversity have actually 
worsened. The notion of establishing a global partnership by 2015 has also made limited 
progress. By then it is likely only a small number of countries will be meeting the target of 
giving 0.7 % of their GDP in foreign aid. Freeing up agricultural trade has also proved a difficult 
concession to wrest from the Global North. 
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STOP AND THINK REFLECTION: would you support you and/or your country’s 
citizens contributing more in taxes towards development in the global South? 
 
Not everyone, of course, is subsumed within the Post Washington Consensus, broad church 
though it is. To the left Structuralists still contend that development is impossible in a 
capitalist world and see salvation as only coming once globalization eats itself and a socialist 
revolution follows. At the other end of the spectrum Economic Liberal purists resent the 
dilution of their credo and, in a case of right meeting left, see Northern interventions in the 
South as merely reproducing dependency. From this perspective, market forces not hand outs 
are the best way to encourage the poor to drag themselves out of the gutter. Hence economist 
Peter  Bauer’s assertion that; ‘aid is a phenomenon whereby poor people in rich countries are 
taxed to support the life-styles of rich people in poor countries’ (Bauer 1976: 115). 
 
Some thinkers and activists have come to question development as a concept altogether. ‘Post 
development theory’ rejects the whole notion of development as has emerged in either the 
orthodox or reformist forms and its coalescence in the Post Washington Consensus. 
Influenced by Critical Theory (see Chapter 9) some writers have, since the early 1990s, 
challenged the ontology (meaning) of ‘development’ as a Northern construct. Majid 
Rahnema, for example, has defined development as; ‘an ideology that was born and refined 
in the North, mainly to meet the needs of the dominant powers in search of a more 
“appropriate” tool for their economic and geopolitical expansion’ (Rahnema 1997: 379). 
 
 
Conclusions 
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Opponents of capitalism will, of course, continue to reject any agenda that is about the 
preservation of the Liberal International Economic Order, however socially-oriented and 
reformist it may be. The rise of a powerful transnational social movement rallying against the 
inequities of globalization over the past decade and the sudden downturn of the global 
economy in 2008, resulting from anarchic private banking practices, offer some hope for the 
radicals that capitalism is a doomed venture  
 
The radicals, however, are increasingly on the margins of the discourse of international 
development policy. The Post Washington Consensus is far more consensual than what 
preceded it and broad global agreement on a reformist Liberal path seems to be well-
established. ‘The principal achievement of the Post Washington Consensus was to head off 
opposition to the most fundamental principles of a liberal international economic order by 
coopting potentially challenging ideas, bringing them into the service of the neo-liberal 
mainstream and rendering their radicalism redundant’ (Payne 2005: 89). 
 
At the 2009 G20 Summit of the world’s leading economic powers, including countries like 
Brazil, China, South Africa, India and Mexico (which had by now superseded the G7 in 
significance), reaffirmed their commitment to development in spite of the pressing concern to 
re-establish their own economic growth. Ideas like IMF reform were also re-aired and a 
commitment to the Millennium Development Goals re-stated, this time with Global North 
countries compelled to acquiesce to them.  
 
Dependency Theory could be applied well to the experiences of countries like Mexico and 
Brazil in the 1940s but, in the 21st Century, it is probably not a realistic prospect for any 
country to cut itself off from the global economy. North Korea’s attempts at self-reliance 
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(added to the pursuit of nuclear weapons technology) resulted in the 1990s famine which has 
killed hundreds of thousands. Development policies have sometimes been counter-productive 
and sometimes self-serving for the Global North but criticizing past practice can be used 
constructively to improve future policy rather than just to pick holes in it (Ziai 2004). 
 
Without doubt, the economic gap between the world’s rich and poor continues to widen and 
many countries remain undeveloped and appear unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future. 
If we return to the Rawls test of gauging fairness in the distribution of resources, the onset of 
political globalization from the mid twentieth century could be considered just since, in spite 
of the growing disparity between rich and poor, the quality of life has improved for nearly all 
the people of all countries. Across the board increases in life expectancy, and more latterly 
and indicatively of Human Development Index (HDI) scores, support this. Of all states in the 
world only Zambia recorded a lower HDI rating in 1999 compared to 1975 (Goklany 2002). 
A recent drop off in HDI of some states however, largely due to a rising problem of disease, 
suggests that global governance is beginning to fail the Rawls test. Some 16 Sub-Saharan 
African states experienced a decline in HDI between 1990 and 2007 (UNDP 2008). The 
overall trend is still upwards but a significant enough number of exceptions to the ‘rule’ have 
emerged to easily be put down to chance or purely internal factors. The Post Washington 
Consensus has put development more to the forefront of international politics than ever but 
the persistence of absolute poverty in a world of sufficient food and resources for all is 
indicative of a similarly persistent global political failing. 
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QUESTIONS 
• Evaluate the past and present impact of the Global South on global economic policy. 
• Why has the traditional approach to understanding economic development been 
challenged and how far has this challenge succeeded? 
• Is the achievement of economic development by the ‘Newly Industrialized Countries’, 
in recent decades, proof that this is also possible for the rest of the Global South? 
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Anthony Payne (2005) The Politics of Unequal Development, Basingstoke UK & New 
York: Palgrave. 
A well-researched study chronicling the progress of international policy and theory on 
development issues since the end of World War Two. An insightful study of how and why 
different prevailing schools of though on development have emerged over time.   
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authoritative introduction to the various themes of development and global poverty suitable 
for university study. 
 
WEBSITES 
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Millennium Development Goals- see the targets and sub-targets in full and regularly 
updated analysis of progress towards meeting them: 
 http://www.undp.org/mdg/ 
 
World Food Programme:   
http://www.wfp.org/ 
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i
 Malnutrition defined by the WFP as a daily intake of below 1,800 calories. 2,100 is the recommended intake. 
